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“… commerce, on a large scale, can prosper only when people can deal confidently with people 
they have never met and have no reason to trust.”1 
 
 
 
The problem of mistaken identity in e-commerce transactions brings together 
seemingly unrelated issues: privacy, network security, digital signatures – and 
classic contract law. The technological characteristics of the Internet have a 
tendency to turn traditional legal doctrines on their head, or, at least expose 
flaws in existing legal arguments. Combining an academic exercise with the 
practical implications of the insecurity of the Internet, this paper draws some 
unexpected conclusions regarding cases of mistaken identity. The latter must be 
analysed afresh with a number of factors in mind: the more widespread use of 
fictitious identities in on-line transactions, the higher incidence of identity theft 
and the greater difficulty of authenticating the other transacting party. The paper 
also observes how the trend to maintain the privacy of Internet users indirectly 
clashes with efforts to ensure transactional security in e-commerce. An 
indispensable prerequisite of the latter is the ability to identify the other party to 
the transaction.  
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The choice to contract with a specific individual is often based on her special skill(s). 
Contractual intention may therefore be directed at a particular person. The resulting legal 
problems can be evaluated as part of the offer and acceptance model or from the perspective of 
the doctrine of mistake.2 Offer and acceptance relate to contract formation; mistake is generally 
considered a vitiating factor affecting the validity of a contract. This paper focuses on the 
technological aspects of mistakes pertaining to the identity of the other contracting party. Once 
identities are embodied in information, not flesh,3 and once transactions occur over an open and 
inherently insecure network, it is necessary to re-evaluate existing approaches to cases of 
mistaken identity.  In particular, it becomes unavoidable to account for the fact that identifying 
the actual, physical person behind a click or an email may be next to impossible. Problems of 
identification are usually discussed alongside attribution, not intention. Attribution focuses on 
accountability for an act, intention relates to the existence of a contract. Both attribution and the 
intention to contract with a specific person require the ability to identify this person. As it is the 
recipient who must prove that the (alleged) sender dispatched the message, attribution is 
predominantly a question of proof.4 Before asking who is accountable for the transaction, 
however, it must first be established whether a contract exists. The presence and effect of a 
potential vitiating factor must therefore be taken into account prior to any discussions of 
contractual liability. A mistake as to identity is a type of unilateral mistake: one party is 
mistaken, the other knows of the mistake or caused it. Generally, a mistake as to the identity of 
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 the other party renders a contract voidable.5 In some circumstances, however, such mistake may 
render the contract void ab initio.  It is these circumstances that require revision in light of the 
characteristics of e-commerce transactions.  
 
1.2 The Problem 
In the classic scenario crook (C) fraudulently represents to the owner of goods (O) that he is 
another person (X) and on that basis O parts with goods to C by way of sale. Is there a contract 
between O and C?  If a contract exists but is voidable, C passes good title to an innocent 
purchaser. If the contract is void, such purchaser cannot obtain valid title. The protection of 
third parties plays a prominent role in all mistaken identity cases. The issue is less relevant 
between O and C, as the mistaken party can rescind for misrepresentation. Little attention is 
usually devoted to the carelessness of O or to X, the person C purports to be. This problem has 
recently been revisited in Shogun Finance Ltd v Hudson.6 The majority in Shogun held that no 
contract was formed between O and C. The decision was predominantly based on the 
construction of the written contract between O and X, the person named in the contract. E-
commerce transactions shed new light on this classic legal problem and expose shortcomings in 
the legal arguments made in cases of mistaken identity. Needless to say, difficulties of 
identification arise in all first time transactions between strangers, not just in e-commerce. The 
latter, however, exacerbates these difficulties. The possibility of holding a contract void (i.e. 
non-existent) due to a mistaken belief as to the other party’s identity must be analysed with two 
factors in mind: first, a more widespread use of fictitious identities in online transactions than in 
the real world and a higher incidence of identity theft, mainly attributable to frequent network 
security compromises; and second, the practical problems of remote authentication over 
insecure networks such as the Internet.  
 
1.3 Terminology 
Some terminological clarifications are necessary. “Identification” is the process of 
distinguishing one entity from another. “Authentication” has multiple meanings: to “establish as 
genuine” or to “associate oneself” with a document, as in “to sign.”7 For present purposes, 
“authentication” refers to the verification of an identity.8 Authenticating documents is therefore 
different from authenticating persons: senders authenticate messages, recipients authenticate the 
senders of messages. Authentication involves the presentation of authentication information that 
confirms the association between a person and an identifier. Authentication information consists 
in something a person knows (password, PIN), possesses (token, smartcard, passport) or is 
(biometric data). Access to authentication information enables the assumption of the identity 
verified by this information. In this sense, the term “identity theft” denotes the unauthorized use 
of authentication information relating to an existing person. It must be emphasized that a 
person’s knowledge of such information does not automatically imply that the person with the 
knowledge is the person to whom such authentication information belongs.9 As all e-commerce 
transactions are conducted at a distance, it seems more correct to speak of “remote 
authentication.”   
 
1.4 Broader Context  
Legal problems never exist in a vacuum. Mistaken identity and the difficulties of authentication 
intersect with general privacy and security concerns posed by the Internet. The process of 
authentication requires the disclosure of authentication information.  Privacy protection, on the 
other hand, aims at hiding the real identities of persons and preventing any association between 
them and their on-line activities.10 Accordingly, privacy requires limiting both the collection and 
the disclosure of authentication information. The more such information is revealed and the 
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 easier the access to such information, the greater the risk of its unauthorized use.11 It must be 
remembered that “personal information” may serve as “authentication information.”12 
Authentication information can be used to create and to verify an identity. Using the 
authentication information of another person amounts to assuming the identity of such person. 
Accordingly, there is an inherent tension between privacy and the need to authenticate the other 
party in an e-commerce transaction.  Privacy requires anonymity whereas successful e-
commerce requires the disclosure of real identities. While being a tool to achieve privacy, 
anonymity is also a means of avoiding accountability. Privacy and authentication are two 
seemingly contradictory objectives. The more so that privacy preservation measures often 
prevent effective authentication, whereas authentication attempts may violate privacy laws. 
 
Additional complications arise from the fact that the Internet is an inherently insecure network. 
Every computer, or device, connected to the Internet is easily compromised and accessed 
without authorization. Hardly a week goes by without news about network security breaches in 
organizations with seemingly impenetrable information systems.13 Experts speak of “rampant 
exploitation of compromised end-user systems.”14 The storage of personal information on an 
insecure network leads to possible misuses of such information due to security breaches.15 Such 
breaches frequently result in the misappropriation of personal information and lead to identity 
theft. While identity theft is not a new phenomenon, its occurrence has risen dramatically since 
the advent of the Internet. Identity theft aside, the inherent insecurity of the Internet also affects 
the ability to establish the identity of the other party: a person may appear to be the originator of 
a message – but he is just a victim of a security flaw in his machine.16  
 
2. Method of communication: face-to-face and “by correspondence” 
The traditional distinction made in mistaken identity cases is between dealings face-to-face17 
and dealings by correspondence.18 In the first scenario, O is presumed to intend to deal with the 
person in front of him, in the latter, the parties are described in the document. The principles are 
not applied consistently, the “blurring” factors being the protection of innocent purchasers, the 
exact moment the representation is made, and the actual intention of the mistaken party. In 
practical terms, the division is between making a contract with the person one intends to deal 
with or the person one actually deals with. In Shogun, the minority expressed the view that 
“new means of communication render the distinction untenable.”19 The majority, however, 
whilst recognizing the problem, did not address its undesirable side effects and re-affirmed the 
distinction. Two arguments can be raised against its continued use in legal arguments. Firstly, 
even conventional transactions are often a mixture of face-to-face dealings and correspondence. 
A written instrument frequently follows oral negotiations. The mistake is identical in both 
situations: O deals with one person but intends to deal with another.20  O deals with the writer of 
the email, the person in front of him or on the other end of the telephone line. Whatever the 
mode of communication, O agrees to sell his goods to the person with whom he is dealing.21  
The presence or absence of “writing” should not constitute a ground for distinction. The essence 
of the transaction is the same – irrespective of how the parties communicate. Accordingly, the 
law should be the same. Secondly, the majority of e-commerce transactions cannot be easily 
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 placed in either category. It is therefore unclear whether the face-to-face presumption can ever 
arise.  Are interactions via instant messengers face-to-face or by correspondence? What 
category does a video-conference fall under? Is it the text-based character of a particular method 
or its real-time quality that is decisive? If the use of any text-based method of communication 
prevents the assumption from arising, it must be concluded that e-commerce transactions tainted 
by a mistake as to the identity of the other party can only be voidable, not void. It is easy to 
devise more examples demonstrating the obvious absurdity of the distinction. Both arguments 
converge on one conclusion: the effect of the mistake – i.e. the existence of a contract – should 
not depend on the communication method used by the parties.22  
 
Irrespective of the above, it must be acknowledged that the communication method affects the 
quality and quantity of authentication information available to O.23 In Phillips v Brooks, the 
face-to-face scenario is described as enabling the identification of the other party by sight and 
hearing.24 When dealing via email or on a website, O is limited to validating the digital 
certificate of the purported sender, if any, or verifying the address information. Frequently, all 
that is available is the IP address or the HTTP referrer. In sum, the information about the other 
party is scarce and unreliable.25 Accordingly, the method of communication may bear on the 
difficulty of authenticating C and the authentication mechanisms available to O.   
 
3. Fundamental Importance: Identity or attribute(s) 
Mistake as to identity is traditionally distinguished from mistake as to attribute(s). The prevalent 
view is that the former renders a contract void, the latter only voidable. Certain attributes are, 
however, perceived as so important that they form part of a person’s identity and a mistake as to 
them can render the contract void.26 Creditworthiness, however, is not one of them. The identity-
attribute distinction has important legal consequences: when C says “I am creditworthy” the 
mistake concerns an attribute and the contract is voidable; when C says “I am someone else who 
is creditworthy” the mistakes relates to identity and the contract is void. As a result, it is in O’s 
interest to prove the fundamental importance of the buyer’s identity. If O succeeds, the contract 
is void (i.e. non-existent) and O retains title to the goods. The identity-attribute distinction must, 
however, be approached with caution. It is not so much the distinction per se, but the 
“fundamental importance” of identity in general that is difficult to maintain in e-commerce 
transactions. The assumption of different identities for on-line transactions is more widespread 
than in the real-world: people assume various identities due to privacy concerns or as an 
expression of personal freedom. A person can adopt whatever name suits her fancy and may 
validly transact under an alias.27 One person can have multiple identities, the same identity can 
be lawfully used by multiple persons. Not only is the concept of identity difficult to define, but 
the online environment increasingly “commodifies” identity28 and dilutes its original purpose – 
that of pinpointing a specific person.  
 
There is no prohibition to adopt a different identity, as long it is not designed to escape liability 
or impersonate another entity. If a person does not pretend to be X, the person is X.29 To 
illustrate: when someone transacts under the pseudonym Pussycat, the other party cannot claim 
that: a) “I intended to contract with another Pussycat,” or, b) “There is no Pussycat” and 
therefore there is no contract. There is a Pussycat. It is the person who sent the message signed 
“Pussycat.” Similarly, if one assumes the pseudonym John Smith, one is John Smith. Pussycat 
and John Smith are equally valid identities. The association between person and name occurs in 
O’s mind only. O’s accidental knowledge of a person bearing a particular name demonstrates 
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 that in many instances the importance of an identity is purely subjective. And subjective 
elements are rarely taken into account in contract law.  
 
Complications arise when someone uses an identity that happens to be the real identity of 
another existing person. The existence of such real person may be accidental and unknown to 
both transacting parties. Where a person assumed what she believed to be a fictitious identity, it 
can be questioned whether one is dealing with a case of mistaken identity in the first place. The 
latter term seems more appropriate in instances of “identity theft”, i.e. the use of identifying 
information to engage in transactions as the person whose identifying information was 
“stolen.”30 It must be remembered that in Cundy v Lindsay31 the contract was held void because 
O only intended to contract with the person named in the correspondence and knew of a 
company dealing under the name assumed by C.  In King’s Norton Metal,32 O was held to intend 
to contract with the writer of the letter and there existed no other entity of the assumed name. 
The contract stayed intact. 
 
Any critique of the identity-attribute distinction is further complicated by the conceptual turmoil 
surrounding “identity” and the inconsistent use of the term in mistaken identity cases.33  After 
all, “identity” is a concept that is often shaped by its context. It must be remembered that only 
persons, not names or identities, become parties to a contract. “Persons” must therefore be 
distinguished from “identities.” It is always a person who assumes an identity. It is always a 
person who enters a shop or sends an email. Persons are primarily identified by names.34 Ideally, 
names should be uniquely attached to persons, pointing to the accountable individual. Names, 
however, are not unique.35 Once used in an open environment, they lose their association with 
persons. As persons cannot be distinguished by names alone, they must be co-defined by their 
attributes. In other words, global uniqueness can only be achieved by combining names with 
attributes.36 “Identity” can therefore be regarded as a construct of a name and one or more 
attributes. The identity-attribute distinction becomes even harder to maintain when one takes 
into account that persons can be identified by their attributes only, e.g. the painter of the picture, 
the person in the room. Frequently – and especially in mistaken identity cases - “identity” is 
used interchangeably with “name.” It is important to differentiate between the two concepts. 
There are a numerous motivations to contract with a particular person. It is, however, illogical 
to assume that one intends to contract with a person because of her name. Names are labels used 
to identify an individual.37 They constitute a pure reference, without regard to any attributes. At 
the same time, however, they constitute a tool to confirm attributes. Some names (such as 
“Warren Buffet”) automatically imply the existence of certain attributes. Even in the latter 
scenario, however, it must be assumed that additional proof is required to confirm that the 
person actually is Warren Buffet. In sum, contracting parties are chosen based on their 
attributes, not their names or identities. Even when identity appears to be of fundamental 
importance, such as in contracts for specialized services, it is because it points to a person with 
specific attributes.38 The importance of “identity” must be limited to cases where contractual 
performance is limited to a given person.39 In such instances, however, it is not a question of 
“identity” being more important than “attribute” but a question of the terms becoming 
practically synonymous as the identity automatically implies the existence certain unique 
attributes. The identity-attribute distinction must be approached with caution whenever the 
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 transaction is of mass-market character, the seller is willing to contract with anybody and the 
contract can be performed by anybody.40 In sum, the focus on “identity” introduces subjective 
and random elements into the discussion tainting the transaction with uncertainty. While the 
concept of “attribute” is relatively straightforward (the good singer, the creditworthy buyer), the 
concept of “identity” remains blurry (who is John Smith?). A contract’s existence must not 
hinge on a distinction ridden with so many ambiguities.  
 
The importance of identity and its potential impact on the existence of a contract must also be 
re-evaluated in light of the difficulties – if not sheer impossibility – of establishing the identity 
of the other party in on-line transactions. 
 
4. Remote Authentication – Digital Signatures 
The Internet is plagued by problems of establishing the individual on the other end of the 
communication channel. While it is possible to identify attachment points on the network, it is 
difficult to tie a person to a specific machine.41 Moreover, information pointing to specific 
computers is easily hidden or manipulated.42 One of the main challenges of Internet-based 
technologies consists in establishing ways of authenticating the other party. A technology, often 
portrayed as the cure-all to all authentication problems, are digital signatures. Their practical 
deployment illustrates the difficulties of remote authentication and the possible futility of 
authentication efforts on insecure networks. Digital signatures are usually discussed in the 
context of formal requirements or the functions of traditional signatures.43 This line of 
argumentation is, however, of limited relevance. Determining whether a digital “signature” 
meets formal requirements is distinct from determining who signed the document. Assuring 
enforceability is pointless if it is unclear who to enforce the contract against. The same can be 
said about determining what intention a signature was made with. Moreover, as signatures do 
not automatically link the name-holder to the signature, carry a presumption of authenticity or 
reverse the burden of proof - none of these functions can be performed by their functional 
equivalents. In sum, comparing digital signatures to traditional signatures is pointless. The term 
itself – digital signatures – must be regarded as a misnomer. One more point before proceeding: 
model regulations44 and statutes45 distinguish between electronic and digital signatures. The 
former relate to any electronic representation of a name, such as letters or digitised handwritten 
signatures, the latter rely on asymmetric cryptography. The regulations differ to the extent that 
some equate digital or electronic signatures with handwritten signatures, without reversing the 
burden of proof, while others create technology-dependent presumptions.  
 
Digital signatures rely on the mathematical correspondence between the private and the public 
key in asymmetric cryptosystems. A message encrypted with the public key can only be 
decrypted with the private one – and the other way round. A  “hash function,” ties the private 
key to the message.  For the digital signature model to work, the public key must be accessible 
to everyone, the private key - exclusively to its authorized user. Absent any natural association 
between person and key-pair,46 a trusted third party must guarantee that a given key belongs to a 
specific person. Consequently, digital signatures must be supported by a public key 
infrastructure (“PKI”) or by a web of trust.47 The cornerstone of PKI is a Certification Authority 
(“CA”), which manages Digital Certificates (“DCs”).48 A DC contains information about the 
person it was issued to (“subscriber”) and the public key. All potential subscribers are 
authenticated by the CA before obtaining a DC. The authentication processes ranges from 
simple verifications that an email belongs to a particular person, to elaborate procedures 
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 entailing notarised documents.  The more comprehensive this process, the stronger the assurance 
that the subscriber is who he claims to be.49 It must not be forgotten, however, that the DC only 
associates a key-pair with an identity – not with a physical person. There is no natural link 
between the digital signature and the subscriber, comparable to the biometric link between a 
person and her handwritten signature or the mathematical correlation between the public and 
private keys. Digital signatures only guarantee that a specific message was transformed with a 
specific private key. Anyone who uses the private key produces a valid digital signature.50 The 
strength of the cipher, the length of the key or the trustworthiness of the CA are unrelated to the 
relationship between the digital signature and the subscriber. While the public key remains in a 
publicly accessible repository managed by the CA, the private key is “at the mercy” of the 
subscriber - usually stored on a networked computer. Networked computers are inherently 
insecure, i.e. can be accessed remotely by unauthorized persons. Access control, (i.e. the 
prevention of unauthorized use of a resource) involves the presentation of authentication 
information. The security of private key depends on the access control measures protecting it. 
The computationally intensive discovery of the private key is usually unnecessary if access to 
the key is protected by a password or PIN, which can be hacked with little effort. It is often 
forgotten that digital signatures are not forged but private keys are used without authorization. 
The key’s security - and therefore the reliability of digital signatures as a method of remote 
authentication - is a function of the security of the authentication information that enables its 
use.  In sum: digital signatures can be a reliable method of remote authentication only if the 
private key is secure – or undeniably tied to the subscriber. Interestingly, while they are 
designed to counterbalance the insecurity of the Internet, they cannot function on an insecure 
network. Taking digital signatures as an example, it can be assumed, that contracting parties 
have limited means of reliably identifying the other transacting party. That is - unless they are 
willing to engage a team of experts in computer forensics. The practical impossibility of 
authentication has a direct bearing on some of the arguments made in mistaken identity cases. 
 
5. Carelessness of O  
C is not the only person responsible for the mistake. C misrepresented who he is, but it is O who 
relied on this misrepresentation. Mistaken identity cases are frequently characterized by some 
carelessness on O’s side. It can be assumed that being concerned with risk allocation, today’s 
courts may consider whether O has been negligent.51 After all, holding the contract void rewards 
the careless O and punishes an innocent third party. As the intention to contract with a specific 
person is evaluated objectively, the party pleading mistaken identity should take reasonable 
steps to authenticate the other party. After all, “if a party takes the risk that the facts are not as 
he supposed them to be, or if he is simply indifferent as to the matter to which the mistake 
relates, the validity of the contract cannot be affected.”52 If O claims that he would not have 
contracted with C, had O not believed C to be X, O should have verified who he was dealing 
with, i.e. establish that the person is X. If O intended to contract exclusively with X,53 there 
should be objective indicia of such intention, e.g. efforts to authenticate X. Otherwise, O’s 
intention to contract with X only, injects a subjective element into the discussion. It appears, 
however, that the classic cases on mistaken identity do not always appreciate the importance of 
O’s efforts to establish that X is in fact X. The reasonableness of O’s belief in C’s statement 
rarely seems to be a decisive factor. It must be remembered that in Cundy v Lindsay,54 O 
verified neither the signature nor the actual address of C. Taking into account that C did not 
forge X’s signature and gave his own address, a simple inquiry could have revealed the fraud. 
                                                 
49
 See generally: D S Anderson, What Trust is in These Times? Examining the Foundation of On-line Trust, 54 
Emory L J 1441 (2005). 
50
 S Matthews, Authorization Models – PKI versus the Real World, 5 ISTR 66 at 66 (2005); A Srivastava, Is Internet 
Security a major issue with respect to the slow acceptance rate of digital signatures? 21 Comp. L. & Sec. Rev. 392 
at 397 (2005). 
51
 Michael Furmston et al., THE LAW OF CONTRACT para [4.108] (2010), see also: H M Howard, The Negligent 
Enablement of Imposter Fraud: A Common-Sense Common Law Claim, 54 Duke L J 1263 at 1271-1276 (2005) 
52
 Michael Furmston, above at note [ ], para [4.79] 
53
 Taylor v Johnson [1932] AC 161 at 217.  
54
 Cundy v Lindsay (1878) 2 App Cas 459. 
 Similarly, in Ingram v Little,55 O verified that X lived at the stated address but did not verify 
whether C was X, i.e. failed to authenticate C. Such authentication was performed in Lewis v 
Averay,56 where C produced an “impressive looking pass” describing him as X. Unfortunately, 
O failed to authenticate the pass. In Shogun, C produced the driving license of X. Assuming that 
it contained a photo of the real X, C must have resembled him or replaced the picture with his 
own. C also forged the signature on the licence. O confirmed the creditworthiness of X on the 
basis of a fax copy of X’s drivers licence. O never verified, however, whether the person 
presenting the licence was X.57 In other words, no authentication of C and no validation of the 
document took place. The claim that the identity of the purchaser was “fundamentally” 
important should only have been upheld if steps were taken to verify this identity, alternatively, 
if the reliance on C’s representations was reasonable. By verifying the creditworthiness of X, 
without confirming that C is X, O’s actions indicated that identity was irrelevant. Again, 
identity was only a means of verifying the attribute of creditworthiness. The question remains: 
under what circumstances is O’s belief in C’s representation reasonable?58 Transposed into an e-
commerce scenario: what efforts should O undertake to authenticate the other party? How high 
is the standard of reasonableness in on-line transactions given the inherent difficulties of remote 
authentication? 
 
6. Accountability of X 
Interestingly, mistaken identity cases never mention the potential liability of X: the person 
whose identity was assumed (or “stolen”). It must be assumed that the outcome of many cases 
would differ if the transaction involved digital signatures, i.e. if X was the subscriber named in 
a DC and C used the digital signature without X’s authorization. If the Shogun scenario was 
decided in line with UNCITRAL’s Model Law on Electronic Signatures (“MLES”), O’s 
reliance on the authentication information provided by C would have to be “reasonable.” More 
importantly, X would be obliged to safeguard the information permitting the replication of his 
identity and inform a third party of any compromise of such information. Modified attribution 
rules would burden X with the risk of unauthorized use of his identity.  
 
Solutions such as those contained in the MLES, are not without drawbacks. In traditional 
transactions, a name-holder is not automatically liable only because his name was used by an 
imposter. Similarly, a person is not liable for somebody forging her signature. It is not for her to 
prove that she did not sign or authorize a particular transaction. Once digital signatures are 
deployed, however, some regulations protect the recipient of a digitally signed message and 
“punish” the person whose “signature” was used. The best example is MLES Art 8, which 
obliges the subscriber to protect the private key and notify the relying party and the CA, if any, 
of its compromise.59 The relying party (O, in our example) must take reasonable steps to verify 
the reliability of a digital signature, and, where such signature is supported by a certificate, 
verify the validity of such certificate.60 Interestingly, it is often forgotten that neither a thorough 
examination of the certificate nor the reliability of the technology reveal or guarantee that the 
private key was used by the subscriber. For the subscriber (X), the challenge lies in protecting 
the private key from unauthorized use, for the relying party (O) – establishing whether the 
private key was used by the subscriber. Despite these challenges, the MLES directs member 
states to establish a presumption or substantive rule based on the technical characteristics of the 
signature and attach consequences to the signatory’s failure to fulfil its obligations under Art 8. 
These range from the alleged signatory being liable for damages or estopped from denying the 
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 signature’s binding effect.61 In sum, the MLES disregards the practical difficulties of deploying 
digital signatures in an insecure network and encourages the creation of legal mechanisms that 
burden the subscriber with the risk of unauthorized use of his digital signature. Some credit 
must, however, be given for recognizing that the party whose digital signature was used must 
not idly await its unauthorized use. Unfortunately, it is difficult to transpose this approach into 
transactions not involving digital signatures: a person will normally not know that her 
authentication information was compromised or that her identity was stolen. More importantly, 
the MLES must be praised for attempting to establish a minimal standard of reasonableness 
when evaluating the authentication information presented by the other party. 
 
7. Conclusions  
On a technical level, it must be accepted that as long as the Internet is plagued by insecurity, it 
is virtually impossible to authenticate the other party to the transaction. While no popular 
technological solution currently exists (short of requiring biometric access to all network end-
nodes) the problem can be partially alleviated by prior agreements between network users (e.g. 
terms and conditions of use frequently found on websites) or by regulatory intervention. Neither 
prior agreement nor regulation, however, constitute methods of authentication. What they can 
achieve is the risk allocation for the unauthorized use of authentication information. It may not 
be possible to establish who used an email account. It may be, however, possible to determine 
who is liable for any activity originating from this account. On a conceptual level, it must be 
appreciated how the on-line environment affects the concept of “identity.”  The distinctions 
traditionally drawn in mistaken identity cases have accumulated critique even before the 
emergence of e-commerce. Evaluated against the background of the new transacting 
environment, they seem to be losing any of their remaining justifications.  
 
It is illogical to even debate the possibility of holding a contract void ab initio in cases of 
mistaken identity if the value of “identity” as a means of distinguishing between persons 
appears questionable. The fundamental importance of “identity” can only be entertained if the 
party seeking to invoke the mistake has undertaken objectively reasonable efforts to 
authenticate the other party. As Internet-based methods of communication affect the quality and 
quantity of authentication information, it becomes more difficult to evaluate the reasonableness 
of such efforts. At the same time, while it must be assumed that O is in the best position to 
uncover the fraud or misrepresentation regarding the other party’s identity, it must also be 
acknowledged that O may have no reliable means of verifying such.  
  
O’s intention does not change depending on whether the contract is embodied on paper or 
concluded face-to-face. Neither does it change depending whether the parties used instant 
messengers or email.  Objectively, a person should be treated as intending to contract with the 
person she is dealing with. If an offer is addressed to X, then it is intended for X – irrespective 
of X’s name or identity and irrespective of the manner of communication. O wants to contract 
with someone who will perform the contract – be it due to his creditworthiness or specific skill. 
 
While it is relatively easy to criticize the distinctions made in mistaken identity cases, it is 
difficult to suggest even simple answers to questions pertaining to reasonableness of the 
authentication efforts expected from the contracting parties. It is one thing to say: authentication 
on an insecure network is impossible, it is yet another to absolve the transacting parties from the 
implied obligation to do whatever is within their reach to establish the identity of the other 
party. For the time being, we must resign ourselves to the fact that e-commerce transactions, 
more than their real-world counterparts, will remain contaminated with uncertainty. 
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